



Extremists who win primaries are 37 percent less likely to win
the general election compared to more moderate candidates.
Recent years have seen growing concern about polarization in Congress, with many suggesting
that voters have been nominating more extreme candidates in primary elections. In new research,
Andrew B. Hall looks at what happens when more ideologically extreme candidates are
nominated, and finds that compared to more moderate candidates, they are 37 percent less likely
to win the general election. He argues that this the current trend towards nominating more
extreme candidates may not be down to voters’ preferences, but to the changing supply of
candidates, which has been influenced by the higher costs and fewer benefits of running.
Legislative polarization in the U.S. is near all-time highs, yet we still have only a dim understanding of its sources
(to say nothing of its possible consequences).  One view is that voters are to blame for the rise in polarization—
that the changing preferences of voters, or at least some subset of voters, has led to more extreme members of
Congress.  Primary voters, in particular, may hold more ideologically extreme views.  Indeed, at least anecdotally,
cases of primary voters nominating more extreme candidates appear to be on the rise, starting with the “Tea Party
Revolution” of 2010.  These anecdotes raise the question: What happens when extremists win primaries?  My
recent research attempts to answer this question in the context of the U.S. House. I find that when parties
nominate a more extreme candidate, then that candidate is 37 percent more likely to lose the general election
compared to one that was more moderate.
To investigate what happens when extremists win primaries in a systematic manner, we need to overcome two
central empirical obstacles.  The first obstacle is that we need a principled, broadly applicable method for
estimating the ideologies of candidates, even though many primary-election candidates never serve in office (and
thus do not cast any roll-call votes).  Building on work by Adam Bonica, I use the mix of campaign contributions
that primary candidates in the U.S. House, 1980—2010, receive in order to estimate their ideology.
The second obstacle is that districts do not nominate extremists randomly—indeed, districts tend to nominate
extremists (of one party or the other) because their voters prefer extremists.  When we look at the association
between a nominee’s extremism and her general-election vote share, we find a relatively flat relationship because
of this selection bias.  To overcome this bias, I focus on close primary races between a more moderate and a
more extreme candidate, approximating an “experiment” in which districts are randomly assigned one type of
nominee or the other.
Combining these two approaches, I am able to measure the consequences of nominating extremists.  In contested
primary elections for the U.S. House where the party nominates an extremist over a more moderate primary
candidate, it is roughly 37 percentage points less likely to win the general election than if it nominates the more
moderate candidate instead.  There is a huge on-average penalty to nominating extremists.
Figure 1 shows this effect.  On the horizontal axis, I plot the vote-share winning margin of the extremist candidate,
among primary elections between an extremist and a more moderate candidate.  When this variable is above 0,
the extremist wins the nomination.  On the vertical axis, I plot the party’s resulting general-election vote share.  As
we see in the plot, as the party goes from just barely nominating the more moderate candidate (to the left of zero
on the horizontal axis, as indicated by the vertical line), to just barely nominating the more extreme candidate,
there is a pronounced downward jump in the party’s general-election vote share.
Figure 1 – Effect of Nominating Extremist on General-Election Vote Share
Considering exactly what these
results mean is important.  The
effects I estimate are the “total” effect
of nominating a candidate who has
chosen to take more extreme
positions.  The penalty might be the
result of general-election voters
behaving in a manner consistent with
the spatial model, preferring more
moderate candidates because of their
ideological positions, or it may not be
the direct result of spatial voting at
all.  Candidates whose positions look
more moderate may also be of higher
quality, may have the support of elites
in the district, and may differ in many
other kinds of ways from those who
choose to take more ideologically
extreme positions.  The strategy of
looking at close elections ensures
that the estimated effects are not
confounded by the unobserved
differences between districts, but it
does not parse out the mechanisms
of the overall effect of nominating extremists.  While my research offers several pieces of evidence that the results
are indeed spatially driven, readers should approach any such mechanism analysis with caution.
But we can still learn much from the overall pattern of results.  Regardless of the mechanism, the results show the
types of candidates that general-elections advantage.  If we think that the ideological composition of the legislature
is an important component of the political process, then the penalty to extremists is important whether or not the
actual mechanism is ideological in nature.
My findings lead to two main conclusions.  First, regardless of primary voters’ preferences, they are unlikely to be
able to “force” extremist candidates into office.  Second, the general election filters aggressively for candidates
who hold more moderate positions.
Why, then, do Democratic and Republican incumbents diverge so much, ideologically? In my ongoing book
project, I argue that we have missed a key factor in the ideological divergence of candidates and, as a result, in
the growth of polarization.  Most of our explanations for polarization focus on the changing demands of voters; I
focus instead on the changing supply of candidates.  Building on the citizen-candidate model, I argue that when
the costs of running for office are high, and/or the benefits of holding office are low, the supply of candidates will
become more ideologically extreme.  I employ a variety of analyses that find strong support for this candidate-
supply theory.  And because, as I argue, the costs of running have gone up (because of increased fundraising
burdens, media scrutiny, and more) and the benefits have gone down over the past few decades (because of
rising opportunity costs in non-legislative careers, among other factors), the candidate supply has helped lead to
the high levels of legislative polarization we see today.
Figure 2 illustrates this dynamic.  In the figure, I plot two time trends.  The lower line plots legislative polarization
over time.  I measure polarization as the estimated ideological distance between each party’s median in the
legislature, using Bonica’s CFScores as my measure of ideology.  The upper line represents candidate-supply
polarization, i.e., the distance in ideology between each party’s median non-incumbent candidate in each election
cycle.  As the plot shows, candidate-supply polarization mirrors legislative polarization closely.  At the same time
as incumbents in the U.S. House are becoming more extreme, the set of candidates voters can choose from are
also becoming more extreme.
Figure 2 – Polarization of the Candidate Supply Mirrors Legislative Polarization
Elections are the key mechanism by which voters control their representatives in a democratic society.  To
understand how, and to what degree, voters succeed in constraining the behavior of those to whom they delegate
power, we need to understand how they go about choosing representatives for office.  In my research I shed light
on one small part of this much broader process.  When voters in closely contested primary elections nominate a
more ideologically extreme candidate, the general election strongly penalizes their choice.  As a result, the general
election is a strong filter on the candidate supply, sending to office those candidates who, on average, are more
moderate than their opponents.
But the power of voters to select for ideologically moderate candidates is limited.  Voters can only choose from
among those people willing to run for office in the first place.  Thus, while they may choose to support relatively
moderate candidates, in times when the candidate supply is extreme, they will have no choice but to elect a
relatively extreme candidate.  To understand the root causes of polarization, as well as to understand the electoral
process more generally, we need to examine not only the way voters choose among candidates, but the way
citizens choose to become candidates.
This article is based on the paper: ‘What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?’ in American Political Science
Review and on Andrew Hall’s upcoming new book: ‘The Candidate Supply: How the Costs and Benefits of
Running for Office Shape the Democratic Process’.
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